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Abstract
This paper tests the pro-competitive e¤ect of trade in the product
and labour markets of UK manufacturing sectors between 1988 and 2003
using a two-stage estimation procedure. In the rst stage, we use data on
9820 rms from twenty manufacturing sectors to simultaneously estimate
mark-up and workersbargaining power parameters according to sector,
rm size and period. We nd a signicant drop in both the mark-up and
the workersbargaining power in the mid-nineties. In the second stage,
we relate our parameters of interest to trade variables. Our results show
that imports from developed countries have signicantly contributed to
the decrease in both mark-ups and workersbargaining power.
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1 Introduction
Investigating the impact of foreign competition on price-marginal cost mark-
ups is a prominent topic in the trade literature. In particular for the UK,
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974), Geroski (1981, 1982) and Conyon and Machin (1991)
show evidence of the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis, i.e. the negative
impact of foreign competition on mark-ups, using sector data. Following Levin-
sohns 1993 (JIE) article, many rm-level studies have drawn on Halls (1988)
approach to estimate price-marginal cost mark-ups and have provided support
for the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis (see Harrison, 1994; Krishna
and Mitra, 1998; Konings et al., 2001; Kee and Hoekman, 2007 among others).
However, Halls (1988) method relies on perfect labour markets. Focusing on
the labour side and inspired by Rodriks (1997) argument that increased inter-
national trade weakens the position of the workers, only two studies (Brock and
Dobbelaere, 2006 and Dumont et al., 2006) have directly investigated whether
stronger import competition squeezes workersbargaining power.1 Dumont et
al. (2006) nd a negative impact using rm-level data covering ve European
countries, whereas Brock and Dobbelaere (2006) do not for Belgium. Using an
extension of a microeconomic version of Halls (1988) framework proposed by
Crépon et al. (1999, 2002) to take into account labour market imperfections, our
main contribution is to provide evidence of international competition curtailing
domestic market power in the product market as well as in the labour market
for UK manufacturing sectors. This is the rst study that addresses both issues
and that focuses on the UK using rm-level data.2
Graph 1 displays the evolution in price-cost margins at the UK sector level
since 1970.3 At rst sight, there is little evidence of a general decline in price-
cost margins despite a steady increase in openness. In fact, at the aggregated
manufacturing level, the price-cost margin was 9.4% in 1970, 8.2% in 1980,
11.5% in 1990 and 9.2% in 2003. How could we reconcile these trends with the
evidence of the pro-competitive e¤ect of international trade highlighted above?
In short, the e¤ect of trade on the price-cost margin is not limited to its impact
on the mark-up, because the price-cost margin only captures the part of the
rents kept by the rms. Price-cost margins are therefore negatively related to
the workersbargaining power and a weakening of the workersbargaining power
may counterbalance, at least partly, a decrease in markups.
1Abowd and Lemieux (1993) showed indirectly that foreign competition has an impact on
workersbargaining power by rstly linking the size of the rents to foreign competition and
secondly the bargaining power to the size of the rents.
2Dumont et al. (2006) include the UK among the ve countries but their sample is much
smaller and they focus on the labour market only.
3Price-cost margin is dened, as in Schmalensee (1989, p.960), as the di¤erence between
revenue and variable cost over revenue. The variable cost is the sum of the costs of variable
inputs, i.e. labour and materials.
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 Graph 1 
Price-cost margins for large UK manufacturing sectors (description in A.1 in Appendix A) 
1970-2003, STAN database 
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Taking into account labour market imperfections, Borjas and Ramey (1995)
provide evidence of foreign competition exerting a negative impact on wages by
reducing rents in concentrated sectors. However, the nding of lower rents per
se does not mean that the rent-sharing scheme between capital and labour has
changed. The seminal paper by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) draws attention
to the importance of product and labour market interactions. Moreover, OECD
studies (e.g. Brandt et al., 2005) point out that product and labour market
deregulations are correlated across countries. Going one step further, Ebell and
Haefke (2006), endogenising the bargaining regime, argue that the strong decline
in coverage and unionisation in the US and the UK might have been a direct
consequence of product market reforms of the early eighties. Boulhol (2006)
develops a theoretical model formalising the idea that capital market and trade
liberalization put pressure on labour market institutions leading to deregulation.
Studying the UK in the eighties and nineties, Pencavel (2004) documents how
the changes in the legal and political framework were undoubtedly detrimental
to unions, but he also stressed that it is the context of ercer product market
competition which determined the impact of the new laws. Moreover, Hornstein
et al. (2005) suggest that, as union density did not fall in the public sector,
competitive pressure seems to be a reasonable cause of deunionisation in the
UK. According to the empirical analysis herein, the trend in UK price-cost
margins is partially the result of the joint decline in the mark-up and the workers
bargaining power following the increased openness of the economy.
We contribute to the literature in di¤erent ways. We take advantage of a rich
rm-level dataset consisting of 9820 rms in the UK manufacturing industry
covering the period 1988-2003. This enables us to estimate mark-up and work-
ersbargaining power parameters simultaneously for 20 sectors split according
to 3 rm size categories and 3 time periods. To our knowledge, investigating the
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the two parameters at this level of disaggrega-
tion has never been carried out for the UK. Whereas previous empirical studies
have tested the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis either on the product
market or on the labour market, our study bridges the gap by verifying the im-
pact of increased import competition on both mark-ups and workersbargaining
power parameters.
We follow a two-stage approach in which we rst estimate mark-ups and workers
bargaining power parameters according to three dimensions (sector, rm size
and time period). Our results point to a signicant drop in both parameters
in the mid-nineties. In the second stage, we identify factors explaining mark-
ups and workersbargaining power with a special focus on international trade.
We nd clear evidence of imports from developed countries having contributed
signicantly to the decline in both mark-ups and workersbargaining power.
In the remainder, we rst describe the theoretical framework and the empirical
strategy (section 2). Section 3 concentrates on the rst-stage results. Section 4
discusses the second-stage results where we evaluate the pro-competitive e¤ect
on both mark-ups and workersbargaining power. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Methodology
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Halls (1988) approach for evaluating mark-ups hinges on one crucial assump-
tion, i.e. rms consider input prices as given prior to deciding their level of
inputs. In other words, there is no imperfection in the labour market. However,
there is widespread evidence of rent-sharing, hence the need for a framework
to bring together imperfect competition in product and labour markets. Theo-
retically, we rely on the model of Crépon, Desplatz and Mairesse (1999, 2002),
detailed further by Dobbelaere (2004), which extends Halls framework to al-
low for the possibility that wages and employment are bargained over between
rms and workers (e¢ cient bargaining).4 We start from a production function
Qit = itF (Nit; Mit; Kit), where i is a rm index, t a time index, N is labour,
M is material input, K is capital and F (:) is assumed to be homogeneous of
degree one in its arguments. it is an index of technical change or truetotal
factor productivity. The logarithmic di¤erentiation of the production function
gives:
qit = "
Q
Nit
nit + "
Q
Mit
mit + "
Q
Kit
kit +it (1)
Each rm operates under imperfect competition in the product market. On the
labour side, we assume that the union and the rm are involved in an e¢ cient
bargaining procedure with both wages (w) and labour (N) being the subject
of an agreement (McDonald and Solow, 1981). The unions objective is to
maximize U(wit; Nit) = Nitv(wit) + (N it  Nit)v (wit), where v(:) is increasing
and concave,5 N it is union membership (0 < Nit  N it), wit is the alternative
wage (wit  wit). Consistent with capital quasi-xity,6 the rm objective is
to maximize its short-run prot function: (wit; Nit; Mit) = R(Nit; Mit)  
witNit   jitMit, where Rit = PitQit stands for total revenue. The outcome of
the bargaining is the asymmetric Generalised Nash solution to:
max
wit; Nit;Mit
fN itv(wit) + (N it N it)v (wit) N itv (wit) git fRit witNit jitMitg1 it
= max
wit; Nit;Mit
fN it(v(wit)  v (wit))git fRit witNit jitMitg1 it (2)
4One popular alternative to Halls methodology is that developed by Roeger (1995). Unfor-
tunately in our precise context, on top of the usual limitations referring either to the intricate
computation of the user cost of capital or the assumption of perfect adjustment of capital,
Roegers specication requires mark-ups to be constant over time, an assumption which is
obviously inconsistent with the very purpose of this study. In addition, when introducing
labour market imperfections, e.g. with e¢ cient bargaining, the derived specication (even
if one assumes time-invariant parameters) cannot identify separately the mark-up and the
bargaining power.
5Crépon et al. (1999, 2000) assume that workers are risk-neutral. We use a more general
framework.
6Crépon et al. (1999, 2000) assume capital quasi-xity. In their framework, what only
matter is that capital is installed before bargaining takes place, which is a very reasonable
hypothesis. When assuming that capital adjusts perfectly, the quasi-rents that unions target
are lower and therefore a higher bargaining power would be needed empirically to match the
data.
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where it 2 [0; 1] represents the workersbargaining power.
Maximization with respect to material input gives RM;it = jit with RM;it the
marginal revenue of material input, which directly leads to:
"QMit = itMit (3)
it =
Pit
CQ;it
refers to the mark-up of price (Pit) over marginal cost (CQ;it) and
Mit =
jitMit
PitQit
. Maximization with respect to employment and the wage rate
respectively gives the following rst-order conditions:
wit = RN;it +
it
1  it

Rit   witNit   jitMit
Nit

(4)
v(wit) = v (wit) +
it
1  it

Rit   witNit   jitMit
Nit

v
0
(wit) (5)
Eq. (5) states that the wage premium over the alternative wage is positively
related to the workersbargaining power and to the size of the rents. Solving
simultaneously (4) and (5) leads to an expression for the contract curve: wit  
RN;it =
v(wit) v(wit)
v0 (wit)
, which is positively sloped if workers are risk-averse (v
00
<
0) and vertical in the (N;w)-space if they are risk-neutral. Expressing the
marginal revenue of labour as RN;it = RQ;itQN;it =
PitQN;it
it
and using this
expression together with (4), the elasticity of output with respect to employment
can be written as:
"QNit = itNit   it
it
1  it
(1  Nit   Mit) (6)
with Nit =
witNit
PitQit
. Assuming constant returns to scale

"QNit + "
Q
Mit
+ "QKit = 1

,
the capital elasticity can be expressed as:
"QKit = 1  itMit   itNit + it
it
1  it
(1  Nit   Mit) (7)
Inserting (3), (6) and (7) in (1) and rearranging terms gives following expression
of the Solow Residual SRit:
SRit  qit   Nitnit   Mitmit   (1  Nit   Mit)kit
= it (qit  kit)  it (1  Nit   Mit) (nit  kit) (8)
+(1  it)it
where it =
it 1
it
is the Lerner index and it =
it
1 it , strictly increasing
functions of the mark-up and the bargaining power, respectively.
Eq. (8) discriminates between the e¢ cient bargaining and the right-to-manage
model. In the right-to-manage model, although wages are determined non-
competitively, they are given before the rms employment decision. Conse-
quently, as in the perfect labour market case, the marginal revenue of labour is
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equal to the wage, and rms stay on their labour demand curve. Hence, the null
hypothesis of it = 0 in Eq. (8) does not only correspond to the assumption
that the labour market is competitive but also to the less restrictive assump-
tion that rms and workers only bargain over wages in a rst step and rms
unilaterally determine their employment level in a second step (right-to-manage
assumption).
By embedding the e¢ cient bargaining model into a microeconomic version of
Halls (1988) framework, the Solow Residual can be broken down into three com-
ponents: (1) a factor representing the Lerner index (it), (2) a factor reecting
the relative bargaining power of the workers (it) and (3) a technological term
(it). Note that, as nit and qit are positively correlated, the original Hall
(1988) approach assuming allocative wages, i.e. neglecting the second term,
generates a downward bias in estimated markups. Moreover, this bias increases
with the bargaining power of the workers. Intuitively, this underestimation cor-
responds to the omission of the part of product rents captured by the workers.
Indeed, Crépon et al. (1999, 2002) estimate their model with and without the
bargaining term on 1026 French rms over the period 1986-1992. They nd
that ignoring labour market imperfections leads to a signicant underestima-
tion of the actual mark-up. The bargaining power is estimated at 0.66 and the
average markup at 1.41, compared to 1.11 only when ignoring the incidence of
rent sharing, both being consistent with a Lerner index or price-cost margin of
0.10 (see Dobbelaere, 2004 and Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2008 for sector-level
evidence in the Belgian and the French manufacturing industry respectively).
2.2 Empirical Framework
To test the imports-as-product-and-labour-market-discipline hypothesis, we fol-
low a two-stage estimation strategy. In the rst part, we estimate the reduced-
form equation (8) which allows us to identify our structural parameters of inter-
est, i.e. the price-marginal cost mark-up ^ and the workersbargaining power b.
We estimate these parameters for 20 sectors in the UK manufacturing industry,
split according to 3 size categories and 3 time periods. In the second part, our
estimated parameters are regressed on international trade variables to test the
hypothesis that international competition curtails domestic product and labour
market power.
3 Part I : Identifying the parameters of interest
^ and b
In this section, we rst present the data. Second, we outline our empirical
strategy and compare consistently xed e¤ects (FE) and Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM) estimates of our parameters of interest at the sectoral level
for all rms and all periods. Finally, we conduct a variance analysis along the
three dimensions, sector, rm size and period.
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3.1 Data
Our analysis is based on two rm-level surveys: OneSource, which covers the
years 1988-1998, and Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME), which o¤ers a
coverage for the years 1994-2003.7 We only keep rms within the manufacturing
industry for which we have at least 4 observations for all variables, ending up
with an unbalanced panel of 9820 rms with the number of observations for
each rm varying between 4 and 14.8
We use turnover deated by the producer price index at the four- and ve-digit
level, according to availability,9 as a proxy for output (Q). Labour (N) refers to
the average number of employees in each rm for each year. Intermediate inputs
(M) are calculated by subtracting the value added from the value of production,
deated by the two-digit materials and fuel price index. The capital stock (K) is
measured by the gross bookvalue of xed assets deated by a price index of net
capital dened at the two-digit level. All deators are drawn from the UK O¢ ce
for National Statistics (ONS). The input shares (N and M ) are computed
by dividing respectively the rm total labour cost and undeated intermediate
inputs by the value of production and by taking the average of these ratios over
adjacent years. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and rst and
third quartiles of our main variables used in the Part I estimation.10
Table 1
Summary statistics
Variables 1990-2003
Mean Sd. Q1 Q3
Real rm output growth rate q 0.014 0.166 -0.081 0.107
Labour growth rate n 0.003 0.129 -0.061 0.062
Capital growth rate k 0.006 0.178 -0.090 0.088
Intermediate inputs growth rate m 0.029 0.189 -0.084 0.138
Share of labour in nominal output N 0.287 0.130 0.192 0.369
Share of intermediate inputs in nominal output M 0.656 0.137 0.567 0.752
Solow residual SRa 0.0008 0.079 -0.037 0.037
q  k 0.007 0.219 -0.116 0.137
(N + M   1) (n k) 0.0002 0.019 -0.005 0.005
7OneSource is a database of company accounts constructed by OneSource Information
Services Ltd, whilst FAME is gathered by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing and both
derive ultimately from the information which companies are required to deposit at Companies
House. For FAME a maximum of 10 years of complete data history can be downloaded at
once. For OneSource we used the CD-ROM entitled UK companies, Vol. 1, October 2000.
Further details on the OneSource dataset can be found in Oulton (1998).
8 In OneSource, the holding companies are reported in addition to their subsidiaries. To
avoid the double accounting, we excluded the holdings.
9The PPI is available at the 5-digit level for the period 1990-2000 and at the 4-digit level
for the period 2001-2003.
10We made two rounds of cleaning: the rst in order to harmonize OneSource with Fame and
to obtain a unique and coherent dataset, and the second to eliminate outliers and anomalies
in the dataset. Details are available upon request.
8
Number of observations: 60579.
a SR = q   Nn  Mm  (1  N   M )k:
We split the total sample into 20 two-digit sectors according to the Standard
Industrial Classication 2003.11 Employment coverage of our sample is on av-
erage 60% of total UK manufacturing employment (SIC 15-37). Table A.1 in
Appendix A shows the sector repartition of the sample.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
The main di¢ culty in estimating the extended Hall-type equation (8) lies in the
potential correlation between the TFP-growth term () and the RHS vari-
ables. The problem arises because the productivity shocks are unobserved by
the econometrician but not necessarily by the rms which, at least, might antic-
ipate them before choosing their factor inputs. In this case, OLS estimates are
likely to be biased. Moreover, the burgeoning literature on rm heterogeneity
stresses the di¤erences in productivity level and growth across rms (Bernard et
al., 2003 for the US and Eaton et al., 2004 for France). As in Harrison (1994),
this problem could be addressed by decomposing the productivity growth term
into a rm and a time xed e¤ect, the latter capturing possible unobservable
aggregate shocks and productivity shocks common to all rms within sector j,
plus a disturbance term:
uijt =
 
1  j

ijt = eij + ejt + vijt (9)
However, since inputs and output are simultaneously determined, the xed-
e¤ects (FE) estimator might still be biased. Taking advantage of the panel
dimension of the data, Eq. (8) can be estimated using the Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM) technique. We use the 3- to 5-year lagged values of the
factor inputs n, m and k as instruments.
To estimate Eq. (8), rm-level variables are deated by a common sector price
index. Output price di¤erences between rms are hence not taken into account
and show up in the error term. This may give rise to downwardly biased and
inconsistent mark-up estimates if output price di¤erences between rms within a
sector are endogenous and correlated with the explanatory variables (changes in
factor inputs and factor shares). This problem might arise when rms compete
in an environment with di¤erentiated products. To address this issue, we can
adopt the solution suggested by Klette and Griliches (1996) which amounts to
adding the growth in sector output as an additional regressor.12 Because we
11We paid attention to the fact that some rms were recorded in two sectors at di¤erent
times. To create a one-to-one match between rms and sectors, each rm was attributed to
the most recorded sector. Sectors 16 and 23 have been dropped due to parsimonious data.
12Theoretically, this solution relies on the assumption that the market power of rms orig-
inates from product di¤erentiation. Intuitively, in the case of product di¤erentiation, the
demand for an individual rms products is a function of its relative price within the sector.
Relative price di¤erences can then be expressed in terms of relative output growth di¤erences
in the sector.
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include time dummies in our estimates run at the sector level, this e¤ect is being
controlled for.
3.3 Comparison of FE and GMM estimates
Table 2 reports the FE and GMM13 estimates for each of the 20 sectors.14 For
the GMM estimates, the parameters of interest (^j and bj , j = 1; :::; 20) are
computed from the two-step estimated values of the reduced-form coe¢ cients
(bj and bj respectively). The estimated standard errors (b) of the estimated
parameters are computed using the Delta Method (Woolridge, 2002).15
The estimated Lerner index (bj) is always very signicant. The estimated
relative bargaining power of the workers (bj) is signicant for 19 out of the 20
sectors with FE, and this number drops to 10 with GMM. However, average
parameters are very similar, around 0.20 for bj and 0.70 for bj , which implies
an average estimated mark-up (^j) of 1.25 and an average estimated workers
bargaining power parameter (bj) of 0.40 respectively. The latter is above Van
Reenens (1996) estimates, lying in the (0.22 - 0.29) range, but is very close to
the UK estimates obtained by Dumont et al. (2006) using a smaller set of rms
and sectors. More specically, the FE range across sectors is (1.12 - 1.45) for
the estimated mark-up and (0.19 - 0.56) for the estimated workersbargaining
power. The GMM specication tests behave well. The overidentication test is
not rejected in all but two sectors. The autocorrelation tests are not rejected
for sixteen sectors.
It is worth noting that the estimated mark-up (^j) and the estimated workers
bargaining power parameter (bj) are positively correlated across sectors. The
correlation between the two estimated structural parameters is 0.71 for the FE
estimates and 0.53 for the GMM estimates. This is consistent with the ndings
of Abowd and Lemieux (1993) that the bargaining power is positively linked to
the size of the rents, and with Dobbelaere (2004) and Dobbelaere and Mairesse
(2008). Boulhol (2008) suggests that, as capital return is determined by the
share of the rents kept by the rms, an arbitrage reasoning based on capital
mobility across sectors can explain this positive correlation.
13The GMM estimation was carried out in Stata 9.1 (Roodman, 2005).
14Note that a considerable share of rms generates negative prots in a given year. For
instance, the sum of the shares of variable factors in output exceeds 1 for 21% of the obser-
vations in our sample, which is not uncommon. In this case, Eq. (8) is not symmetrical as
bargaining does not apply to negative prots. In particular, wages cannot be lower than the
marginal revenue of labour. It follows directly that
 
1  Nit   Mit

(nit  kit) in (8)
equals zero when the sum of the variable input shares exceeds one. We also tried to limit the
sample to those observations of which the sum of the variable input factors is lower than 1.05
and found similar results.
15b = b(1 b)2 ; b = b(1+b)2 :
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Table 2
Sector analysis: Estimated sector-level mark-up μˆj and workers’ bargaining power φˆj , FE and GMM results
YEAR AND FIRM FIXED EFFECTS GMM
Code
# Obs.
(# Firms)
βˆj μˆj =
1
1−eβj
bγj φˆj = eγj1+eγj βˆj μˆj = 11−eβj bγj φˆj = eγj1+eγj Sargan m1 m2
15 3893 (787) 0.195∗∗∗ (0.008) 1.242∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.670∗∗∗ (0.120) 0.401∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.032) 1.247∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.350 (0.441) 0.259 (0.242) 0.153 0.000 0.189
17 1957 (377) 0.178∗∗∗ (0.010) 1.216∗∗∗ (0.014) 1.137∗∗∗ (0.165) 0.532∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.211∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.267∗∗∗ (0.059) 1.679∗∗∗ (0.543) 0.627∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.547 0.000 0.025
18 834 (192) 0.111∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.124∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.420∗ (0.254) 0.296∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.134∗∗∗ (0.027) 1.155∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.022 (0.711) 0.022 (0.681) 0.999 0.000 0.233
19 432 (74) 0.103∗∗∗ (0.019) 1.115∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.238 (0.371) 0.192 (0.242) 0.101∗∗∗ (0.036) 1.112∗∗∗ (0.045) 1.272∗ (0.680) 0.560∗∗∗ (0.132) 1.000 0.000 0.309
20 948 (213) 0.145∗∗∗ (0.016) 1.170∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.597∗∗ (0.268) 0.374∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.076∗∗∗ (0.021) 1.082∗∗∗ (0.246) -0.302 (1.840) -0.433 (3.777) 1.000 0.000 0.415
21 1565 (306) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.013) 1.246∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.841∗∗∗ (0.145) 0.457∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.213∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.271∗∗∗ (0.060) 1.155∗∗∗ (0.274) 0.536∗∗∗ (0.059) 0.487 0.000 0.498
22 4824 (1120) 0.187∗∗∗ (0.007) 1.230∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.244∗∗∗ (0.075) 0.196∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.191∗∗∗ (0.035) 1.236∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.316 (0.287) 0.240 (0.166) 0.117 0.000 0.079
24 4061 (781) 0.235∗∗∗ (0.009) 1.308∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.821∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.451∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.209∗∗∗ (0.038) 1.264∗∗∗ (0.051) 1.171∗∗ (0.460) 0.539∗∗∗ (0.098) 0.030 0.000 0.187
25 3194 (612) 0.200∗∗∗ (0.009) 1.250∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.455∗∗∗ (0.107) 0.313∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.212∗∗∗ (0.034) 1.269∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.066 (0.358) 0.062 (0.315) 0.245 0.000 0.125
26 1607 (305) 0.236∗∗∗ (0.016) 1.309∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.978∗∗∗ (0.174) 0.494∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.253∗∗∗ (0.056) 1.339∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.552 (0.476) 0.356∗ (0.198) 0.502 0.000 0.672
27 1779 (337) 0.186∗∗∗ (0.011) 1.329∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.733∗∗∗ (0.192) 0.423∗∗∗ (0.064) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.266∗∗∗ (0.053) 1.385∗∗ (0.566) 0.581∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.373 0.000 0.213
28 5061 (1115) 0.190∗∗∗ (0.007) 1.235∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.442∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.306∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.175∗∗∗ (0.034) 1.212∗∗∗ (0.050) -0.231 (0.264) -0.300 (0.446) 0.075 0.000 0.017
29 5417 (1101) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.006) 1.247∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.829∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.453∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.225∗∗∗ (0.031) 1.290∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.869∗ (0.507) 0.465∗∗∗ (0.145) 0.105 0.000 0.039
30 563 (142) 0.179∗∗∗ (0.018) 1.219∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.523∗∗∗ (0.202) 0.344∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.159∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.189∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.179 (0.251) 0.152 (0.181) 1.000 0.001 0.353
31 2181 (475) 0.273∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.375∗∗∗ (0.023) 1.228∗∗∗ (0.147) 0.551∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.318∗∗∗ (0.043) 1.466∗∗∗ (0.092) 1.046∗∗ (0.451) 0.511∗∗∗ (0.108) 0.729 0.000 0.170
32 1393 (325) 0.309∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.448∗∗∗ (0.032) 1.289∗∗∗ (0.211) 0.563∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.390∗∗∗ (0.041) 1.639∗∗∗ (0.110) 1.316∗∗∗ (0.467) 0.568∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.707 0.000 0.611
33 2155 (478) 0.222∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.285∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.637∗∗∗ (0.148) 0.389∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.266∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.252 (0.488) 0.201 (0.311) 0.821 0.000 0.020
34 1682 (320) 0.193∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.239∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.807∗∗∗ (0.223) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.269∗∗∗ (0.026) 1.368∗∗∗ (0.049) 1.526∗∗∗ (0.486) 0.604∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.650 0.000 0.301
35 847 (205) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.306∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.951∗∗∗ (0.188) 0.488∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.230∗∗∗ (0.026) 1.299∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.807∗∗ (0.368) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.113) 1.000 0.000 0.302
36 2468 (555) 0.173∗∗∗ (0.009) 1.210∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.627∗∗∗ (0.136) 0.385∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.174∗∗∗ (0.031) 1.211∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.265 (0.414) 0.209 (0.259) 0.377 0.000 0.971
Sector average 0.197 (0.012) 1.250 (0.018) 0.723 (0.172) 0.403 (0.065) 0.208 (0.044) 1.272 (0.068) 0.685 (0.517) 0.310 (0.378)
SRit = ∆qit − αNit∆nit − αMit∆mit − (1− αNit − αMit)∆kit
= β (∆qit −∆kit)− γ (1− αNit − αMit) (∆nit −∆kit) + (1− β)∆θit
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗ Significant at 10%.
Time dummies are included but not reported. FE: robust standard errors in parentheses.
GMM: robust standard errors with finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix (Windmeijer, 2005).
Sargan: test of overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimator, asymptotically distributed as χ2df . p-values are reported.
m1 and m2: tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-diﬀerenced residuals for the GMM estimator,
asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1). p-values are reported.
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Table 3 compares the FE and the GMM estimates more synthetically. The
trade-o¤ between the two should be that GMM reduces the bias (see section
3.2) at the cost of less precise estimates. The results indicate that the GMM
estimates are more dispersed across sectors, even leading to two (insignicant)
negative bargaining power parameters. However, the correlation between the
FE and the GMM estimates is strong and signicant. For the estimated Lerner
indexes, the Pearson correlation coe¢ cient is close to 0.90 between FE and
GMM. For the estimated relative bargaining power parameters, it reaches 0.57
unweighted and 0.72 when weighted to take into account the precision of the
estimates. All in all, as the average level of the two parameters are very close
with FE and GMM, FE proves to be as e¢ cient as GMM. This comparison
suggests that the year and rm xed e¤ects do a good job in accounting for
the heterogeneity in productivity growth across rms. Harrison (1994) shows
that her FE and IV estimates are very close and, consequently, sticks to the FE
results as Levinsohn (1993) does. We follow the same route for the remainder
of this study.
Table 3
Correlation between FE and GMM estimates
Correlation FE-GMM
Mean Sd. Min Max Unweighted Weight 1 Weight 2bj FE 0.197 0.048 0.103 0.309 0.89 0.85 0.86
GMM 0.208 0.069 0.076 0.390bj FE 0.723 0.298 0.238 1.289 0.57 0.72 0.71
GMM 0.685 0.611 -0.302 1.679
Weight 1: 1b2FE , weight 2: 1bFEbGMM
3.4 Variance Analysis
The above estimates should be considered as sectoral average parameters. There
are, however, many reasons to believe that mark-up and bargaining power pa-
rameters vary across time and rm size. What follows conrms this presump-
tion. In addition to the sectoral dimension, the sample is split according to size
and period criteria. For the former, the sample is divided between small rms
(fewer than 75 employees on average), medium-sized rms (between 75 and 200
employees) and large rms (more than 200 employees), which provides three
subsamples of comparable size. For the latter, three subperiods are dened:
1991-1994, 1995-1998, 1999-2003.16 This leaves us with 179 estimates for the
mark-up and the bargaining power parameter: 20 sectors x 3 periods x 3 size
classes, minus sector 19, rst period, small rms due to lack of data.
Before formally assessing the determinants of the two parameters of interest,
we conduct a variance analysis along the three dimensions presiding over the
16We start in 1991 to allow for lags.
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splitting of the sample. 17 out of the 179 Part I estimates display a negative
estimated bargaining power and 2 out of the 179 Part I estimates are estimated
to be larger than 1. However, none of these 19 estimates are estimated to be
signicant. As a robustness check, the various results are compared with and
without the 19 outliers.
As for the estimated mark-ups (see the left part of Table 4), the three dimen-
sions (sector, size and period) are very signicant at the 99% condence level, the
sectoral dimension, as expected, accounting for the larger part of the explained
variance. Two ndings show up clearly. First, mark-ups drop signicantly and
importantly by around 7 percentage points between the rst and the second
period. Second, the estimated mark-up is increasing in rm size. This is consis-
tent with both theory (e.g. Cournot competition) and empirical evidence in the
heterogeneous rm literature. The di¤erence according to rm size is especially
true between the small rms and the others.
The right part of Table 4 reports the variance analysis for the estimated workers
bargaining power parameters. The sector share of the explained variance is also
predominant. Similar to the estimated mark-up, the workersbargaining power
dropped signicantly, by around 0.12, after the rst period. This decrease in
the workersbargaining power echoes Blanchower and Bryson (2004) who nd
a signicant decline in the union wage premium after 1994 for the UK. It is also
consistent with the diluted role of UK labour market institutions, documented
by Machin (1997). In addition to other legislative measures, he draws attention
to the abolition of the Wages Council system of minimum wages in August 1993,
covering 2.5 million workers at that time. Moreover, the workersbargaining
power is estimated to be lower, by around 0.05, for the smaller rms. However,
this di¤erence is only signicant with the medium-sized rms.17
17When we drop the 19 estimated bargaining power parameters that are outside the [0; 1]-
range, we nd very similar results.
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Table 4
Variance analysis
Mark-up ^jsp Barg. power bjsp
PERIOD (ref: 1991-1994)
1995-1998
-0.070
(0.024)
-0.120
(0.021)
1999-2003
-0.067
(0.025)
-0.126
(0.022)
SIZE (ref: small rms)
Medium-sized
0.050
(0.014)
0.055
(0.025)
Large
0.055
(0.016)
0.029
(0.026)
Adj. R2 0.283 0.573
# Obs. 179 179
SHARE OF EXPL. VARIANCE
Sector 73% 71%
Period 11% 26%
Size 16% 3%
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, they have been
corrected to account for the generated regressand problem
following Lewis and Linzer (2005) and clustered at the sector-period level.
 Signicant at 1%;  Signicant at 5%;  Signicant at 10%.
4 Part II : Testing the imports-as-product-and-
labour-market-discipline hypothesis
This section concentrates on the identication of the e¤ect of increased import
competition on both the estimated mark-ups and workersbargaining power pa-
rameters. Since our dependent variables in the Part II estimations are estimated
in a rst step, the rst step (or sampling) variance must be taken into account.
Lewis and Linzer (2005) develop a Feasible Generalised Least Squares estimator,
EDV (Estimated Dependent Variable), that, compared to OLS, corrects for both
estimated parameter values and standard errors. Lewis and Linzer show that
EDV is more e¢ cient than estimators that correct for standard errors only.18
18Dumont et al. (2005) propose a corrected OLS estimator that provides a procedure to
correct for estimated standard errors only and that is unbiased even in small samples. However,
when the sampling variance is large the loss in e¢ ciency compared to EDV could be important.
Besides, Lewis and Linzer (2005) report that their EDV estimated standard errors show little
to no bias even in samples as small as 30 observations. As a check, we nevertheless implemented
the Dumont et al. (2005) procedure, which led to similar inferences to those drawn from the
results presented below. The main di¤erence refers to the point estimates when the bargaining
power is the dependent variable, which suggests that the sampling variance plays a greater
role in that case.
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In addition, we cluster standard errors at the sector-period level19 to deal with
intra-cluster serial correlation, correlation generated by common shocks, and
all other forms of intra-cluster correlation (Rogers, 1993; Woolridge, 2002). A
description of all variables used in this section and data sources are reported in
Table A.2 in Appendix A. Our main focus is the impact of international trade
on our two parameters of interest.
4.1 Mark-up
4.1.1 Specication
Firms under intensifying pressure from foreign competition are induced to re-
duce their margins because of the increase in the perceived elasticity of the
demand they are facing. This elasticity depends on the elasticity of substitu-
tion between varieties, the concentration level and the intensity of competition.
The following variables are dened. IMPORT is the share of imports in
sectoral demand. Trade theory highlights that the impact of imports is dif-
ferentiated depending on the origin of the imports. For a developed coun-
try like the United Kingdom, trade with developing countries is supposedly
based on comparative advantage and the impact of trade is mainly channelled
through reallocation between sectors. In contrast, trade with developed coun-
tries is mostly intra-industry. It is based on imperfect competition and is
therefore a better candidate for the pro-competitive e¤ect on mark-ups. We
distinguish IMPNORTH, which is the share of imports from Western Eu-
rope, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand in total demand, from
IMPSOUTH, its complement. Since rms are likely to select foreign markets
based on the margins they o¤er for their products, exports could be positively
related to markups. The export ratio at the rm level is EXPFIRM . Ta-
ble A.3 in Appendix A summarises the changes of the import variables over
the period. The absence of correlation between the changes in imports from
developed countries and those from developing countries across sectors is par-
ticularly striking (linear coe¢ cient of -3%), implying that these trends reect a
very distinct rationale.
When competition intensies, rmsreaction is not limited to pricing behaviour.
Sutton (1991, 1998) insists on the endogeneity of market structure. An increase
in the competitive environment may trigger an endogenous reaction of rms,
through an increase in R&D or advertisement spending for instance. This might
force out rms that are unable to keep the pace. R&D could hence be positively
related to mark-ups. R&DRATIO is dened as the share of R&D spending in
total output at the sectoral level.
There is a lack of data to take into account the change in domestic competition
at the sectoral level. At the country level, we test three variables that might
have an impact on mark-ups. PMR is the product market regulation index
19Since our key variable of interest, imports, varies at the sector-period level only, we cluster
standard errors at that level (cfr. infra).
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computed by the OECD on a scale from 0 to 6, in ascending order of regulation.
The series is available for 1988, 1993, 1998 (Nicoletti et al., 2001) and 2003
(Conway et al., 2005), and is linearly interpolated between these years.20 For
the UK, it has decreased from 3.5 in 1988 to 1.0 in 2003. The second variable is
the (log of) stock market capitalisation as a share of GDP , CAPIT . Hoekman
et al. (2001) argue that nancial deepening reduces the cost of capital, thus
increasing the overall protability of the economy. They provide evidence of
stock market capitalisation exerting a signicantly positive impact on average
sector mark-ups. Finally, the Herndahl index, HERF , is calculated from our
sample. Caution is required using this variable as it is very sensitive to the entry
or exit of big rms in the database at di¤erent times.
Because of its importance in the drawing up of macroeconomic policies, an abun-
dant literature deals with the cyclicality of mark-ups. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999) provide some detailed theoretical explanations, such as overhead labour,
adjustment costs and labour hoarding, in support of the counter-cyclicality
of mark-ups. The debate whether mark-ups are pro- or counter-cyclical re-
mains unresolved although the empirical evidence rather leans towards counter-
cyclicality. We use the annual change in value-added, and V ALUCY C is the
de-trended series using a Hodrik-Prescott lter. Our empirical specication can
be expressed as:
bjsp= 1Lag(IMPORT jp) + 2Lag(EXPFIRM jsp) + xXjsp+ej+es+ep+jsp
(10)
with j, s and p indexing sector, size and period, respectively.
To account for the endogeneity problem of trade and other variables, all ex-
planatory variables are lagged, except for rm size, the cyclical variable and
the Herndahl index. We use 3-year lagged values of the endogenous variables.
In order to avoid overlapping between the subperiods, ideally we would need
5-year lags. However, such a long lag is likely to weaken the explanatory power
substantially and we therefore use it as a robustness check only.
Appendix B provides some evidence that the import variable is related to struc-
tural policy measures. In particular, there seems to be a positive relation across
sectors between the changes in the IMPNORTH ratio and the expected im-
pact of the 1992 Single Market Program. This is reassuring because this means
that the trade ratio seems to capture reasonably well the major structural re-
forms that took place at the beginning of the period under study.
4.1.2 Results
The estimates are presented in Table 5. The main result is that imports exert
a negative impact on mark-ups, although this e¤ect is not signicant when the
origin of imports is not di¤erentiated. As column (2) indicates, this is because
20The indicator is based on seven non-manufacturing sectors (energy, communication and
transport). It is very correlated (linear coe¢ cient of around 86%) to the regulation index for
the whole economy, only available for 1998 and 2003.
16
only imports from developed countries appear to have a signicant e¤ect, which
is consistent with the discussion above. The estimated impact looks strong, as
an increase of one point in the share of imports from the North in total demand
would trigger a decrease of around one point.
Exports never show up as being signicant. Consistent with the heterogenous
rm literature, we nd that exports increase with rm size, as the export ratio
is on average 0.065 higher for the large compared to the small rms. However,
it seems that the size-e¤ect on mark-ups is not amplied by the export status.
When we substitute the (log of) average employment EMPL to the size dum-
mies or when the sample is restricted to the positive bargaining power obser-
vations, the results are not altered. When time dummies are withdrawn, the
coe¢ cient of the cyclical variable V ALUCY C is negative and signicant in two
specications, hence supporting the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups.
As a robustness check, we use 5-year lags which produce in general qualitatively
similar -although not always signicant- results. As an illustration, we report
in the last column the specication consistent with the one in column (2).
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Table 5
Determinants of estimated price-cost mark-up ^jsp
Variables (1)a (2)a (3)a (4)a (5)a (6)a (7)b
1995-1998
-0.044
(0.027)
-0.060
(0.025)
-0.060
(0.025)
-0.075
(0.026)
1999-2003
-0.032
(0.026)
-0.027
(0.023)
-0.025
(0.022)
-0.045
(0.014)
Medium-sized
0.045
(0.015)
0.044
(0.014)
0.045
(0.014)
Large
0.049
(0.017)
0.051
(0.017)
0.053
(0.017)
EMPL
0.016
(0.005)
0.016
(0.005)
0.016
(0.005)
0.016
(0.005)
VALUCYC
-0.123
(0.272)
0.019
(0.255)
0.013
(0.252)
-0.310
(0.186)
-0.362
(0.189)
-0.328
(0.194)
0.025
(0.268)
lag(EXPFIRM)
0.062
(0.178)
0.001
(0.178)
-0.021
(0.174)
-0.016
(0.171)
-0.019
(0.171)
-0.008
(0.173)
-0.035
(0.181)
lag(IMPORT)
-0.272
(0.427)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-1.133
(0.522)
-1.161
(0.511)
-0.849
(0.482)
-0.934
(0.523)
-0.890
(0.550)
-1.492
(0.523)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
0.241
(0.339)
0.245
(0.328)
0.307
(0.307)
0.202
(0.325)
0.310
(0.307)
0.794
(0.368)
lag(R&DRATIO)
4.523
(3.372)
3.971
(2.797)
4.055
(2.747)
3.990
(2.871)
3.934
(2.935)
3.818
(3.272)
2.645
(2.487)
lag(PMR)
0.017
(0.013)
0.018
(0.013)
lag(CAPIT)
-0.018
(0.028)
HERF
-0.068
(0.259)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.302 0.340 0.338 0.324 0.318 0.320 0.340
#Obs. 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
The dependent variable (price-cost mark-up) is taken from the Part I estimation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
they have been corrected to account for the generated regressand problem following Lewis and Linzer (2005) and
clustered at the sector-period level.
Signicant at 1%; Signicant at 5%; Signicant at 10%.
a 3-year lags used.
b 5-year lags used except for EXPFIRM . For this variable, we are forced to take 3-year lags because of data availability
in the rst sub-period.
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4.2 WorkersBargaining Power
4.2.1 Specication
Formalising the impact of foreign competition on workersbargaining strength is
not as straightforward as doing so on mark-ups, even if it is generally reected
in the increase in the elasticity of labour demand due to imports, for which
Fabbri et al. (2003) provide some evidence for low skilled workers. Rodrik
(1997) points out that imports increase the substitution between domestic and
foreign workers. Moreover, the possibility of o¤shoring improves the position
of employers in bargaining and at the same time narrows the range of outside
options available to workers. Therefore, pressure from foreign competition could
increase the risk of breakdown in bargaining and loosen labour market tightness,
thereby diminishing workersbargaining power (see Brock and Dobbelaere, 2006
and Dumont et al., 2006 for a further discussion). Pencavel (2004) documents
the surprising retreat of union Britain. He details the changes in the legal
framework for unionism in the 1980s and 1990s and suggests that the context of
a harsher domestic and international competitive environment determined the
impact of the new laws.
In addition to the variables described in section (4:1:1), we evaluate the e¤ect of
three labour market variables on workersbargaining power: UNIONDENS,
REPLRATE and UNEMPRATE, referring to union density, the replacement
rate and the unemployment rate at the country level respectively. Union density
and the replacement rate are expected to be positively related to the workers
bargaining power, as shown by Karier (1985) and Conyon and Machin (1991).
For the unemployment rate, the link might not be clear-cut. An increase in
the unemployment rate has a negative e¤ect on the outside option, hence a
negative relationship with the workersbargaining power is expected. However,
because the union wage premium softens the impact of shocks on wages, Blanch-
ower and Bryson (2004) nd that the union wage premium is counter-cyclical,
pointing to a positive relationship. Therefore, the resulting e¤ect is, a priori,
ambiguous.
Product market deregulation (PMR) has been found to be positively correlated
to labour market deregulation across countries and seems to precede labour mar-
ket reforms (see Fig. 34 in Brandt et al., 2005). If capital deepening (CAPIT )
is linked to increased capital mobility, it might have a negative impact on the
workersbargaining power. Finally, it is often argued that technological change,
instead of international trade, triggers changes in the labour market (see e.g.
Berman et al., 1994; Krugman and Lawrence, 1996). Technological change
(R&DRATIO) might exert an e¤ect on the workersbargaining power by im-
pacting the nature of the production process. However, this e¤ect is, a priori,
unclear. As discussed in Betcherman (1991), it depends on the importance of
labour costs in the rms total costs and on the workers essentiality in the
production process.
Finally concentration (HERF ) can have two opposite e¤ects on the bargain-
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ing power. On the one hand, in concentrated sectors, rms may tend to have
monopsony power in the labour market which weakens the workersbargaining
power. On the other hand, as argued by Veugelers (1989), output concentration
may allow rms to shift costs on to customers more easily and accept stronger
unions. Ebell and Haefke (2006) nd a positive correlation between concentra-
tion and union coverage in a cross-section of US sectors.
To test the imports-as-labour-market discipline hypothesis, we estimate the fol-
lowing specication:
bjsp= 1Lag(IMPORT jp) + 2Lag(EXPFIRM jsp) + xXjsp+ej+es+ep+jsp
(11)
with j, s and p indexing sector, size and period, respectively.
4.2.2 Results
Our results, which are reported in Table 6, provide robust evidence of imports
from developed countries having squeezed the workersbargaining power. Total
imports is also signicant but this is only due to the e¤ect of imports from
developed countries. An increase of one point in the share of imports from the
North seems to have reduced the bargaining power by 0.008 on average.21 The
fact that only increased import competition from the North exerts a signi-
cantly negative impact might seem surprising at rst sight. However, one would
need to rely on a more detailed skill structure within sectors to have a clearer
analysis. Our results seem to point out that, because of similar characteris-
tics in terms of education, productivity and skills, foreign workers in developed
countries are more substitutable through imports to UK workers than those
in developing countries. Interestingly, Neven and Wyplosz (1999) nd similar
e¤ects. Also, Greenaway et al. (1999) study the impact of international trade
on UK employment between 1979 and 1991. They nd that only imports from
developed countries had a negative impact, which is even more surprising, and
suggest that the competition from developing countries is in sectors that had
already declined in the 1970s.
The coe¢ cient on EXPFIRM is positive and signicant at 10% in three spec-
ications. Because most of the other explanatory variables lack the sectoral
dimension, we run into severe multicollinearity issues. This makes it almost
impossible to disentangle the e¤ect of these country variables. Therefore, we
test each of them separately, keeping in mind that the contribution of each
variable should not be cumulated. The impact of UNIONDENS, PMR,
REPLRATE, CAPIT and UNEMPRATE show up signicantly. The rst
two variables have the highest explanatory power. Deunionisation seems to be
associated with a decline in the workersbargaining power between 1991 and
2003. Product market and labour market deregulation are found to go hand
21Considering 5 EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK), Dumont et
al. (2006) nd a comparable e¤ect.
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in hand. A higher unemployment rate, a lower replacement rate and nancial
deepening seem negatively related to the workersbargaining power. Finally,
the workersbargaining power is found to be signicantly higher in concentrated
sectors whereas no signicant relationship is detected with R&D.22
22As a robustness check, limiting ourselves to the 160 bargaining power Part I esti-
mates lying in the [0; 1]-interval produces similar results. Also, we used a logit transfor-
mation. The results are presented in Table A.4 in Appendix A. As can be seen, the or-
ders of magnitude are comparable but the the logit specication leads to less signicant
estimates. When the bargaining power is the dependent variable, the average parameter
on IMPNORTH is around  0:80, i.e.    0:80IMPNORTH. With the logit
specication, the average IMPNORTH parameter is around  3:0 from which we infer:
 ln


1 

  3:0IMPNORTH ()    3:0 (1  ) IMPNORTH. The av-
erage estimated bargaining power is around 0.40 (Table 2), hence an average sensitivity of
 3  0:4  0:6 =  0:72. Of course, from the logit specication the implied sensitivity to
IMPNORTH depends on the level of the bargaining power. One can calculate that this
sensitivity is equal to  0:27 when the bargaining power is 0:10 and  0:63 when it is 0:70.
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Table 6
Determinants of the estimated workers’ bargaining power bφjsp
Variables (1)
a
(2)
a
(3)
a
(4)
a
(5)
a
(6)
a
(7)
a
(8)
b
(9)
b
(10)
b
1995-1998
-0.112∗∗∗
(0.021)
-0.109∗∗∗
(0.021)
-0.115∗∗∗
(0.023)
1999-2003
-0.108∗∗∗
(0.027)
-0.108∗∗∗
(0.027)
-0.119∗∗∗
(0.029)
Medium-sized
0.049∗
(0.026)
0.048∗
(0.026)
0.045∗
(0.026)
0.061∗∗
(0.026)
Large
0.015
(0.029)
0.016
(0.029)
0.011
(0.029)
0.036
(0.028)
EMPL
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.0005
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
lag(EXPFIRM)
0.284
(0.194)
0.297
(0.203)
0.378∗
(0.212)
0.370∗
(0.214)
0.235
(0.209)
0.348
(0.216)
0.344
(0.216)
0.343∗
(0.200)
0.200
(0.200)
0.256
(0.207)
lag(IMPORT)
-0.376∗∗
(0.181)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-0.850∗∗
(0.323)
-0.655∗
(0.349)
-0.665∗
(0.365)
-1.539∗∗∗
(0.333)
-0.817∗∗
(0.408)
-0.836∗
(0.411)
-0.476
(0.488)
-0.935∗
(0.524)
-1.020∗∗
(0.510)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
0.211
(0.285)
0.327
(0.288)
0.303
(0.304)
-0.416
(0.364)
0.140
(0.367)
0.117
(0.372)
0.189
(0.437)
-0.768
(0.537)
-0.733
(0.603)
lag(R&DRATIO)
-2.041
(1.696)
-1.688
(1.508)
-1.305
(1.644)
-1.359
(1.728)
-2.040
(1.695)
-1.612
(2.018)
-1.653
(2.040)
-0.107
(1.779)
-1.517
(2.544)
-1.481
(2.639)
lag(PMR)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.016)
lag(UNIONDENS)
1.384∗∗∗
(0.320)
lag(UNEMPRATE)
-2.281∗∗∗
(0.676)
REPLRATE
3.795∗∗∗
(1.116)
lag(CAPIT)
-0.115∗∗∗
(0.035)
HERF
0.274∗
(0.148)
0.390∗∗
(0.170)
0.408∗∗
(0.182)
0.292
(0.206)
0.449∗∗
(0.219)
0.451∗∗
(0.222)
0.321∗∗
(0.158)
0.501∗
(0.290)
0.536∗
(0.288)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.576 0.581 0.553 0.546 0.525 0.521 0.519 0.573 0.492 0.473
#Obs. 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
The dependent variable (workers’ bargaining power) is taken from the Part I estimation. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses, they have been corrected to account for the generated regressand problem following Lewis and Linzer (2005)
and clustered at the sector-period level..
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
a 3-year lags used.
b 5-year lags used except forEXPFIRM . For this variable, we are forced to take 3-year lags because of data availability in the first subperiod.
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4.3 Exporters versus non-exporters
To test whether the competitive e¤ect of imports is dependent on the export
behaviour of rms, we subdivided the original sample into exporting and do-
mestically oriented rms (labelled non-exporters hereafter). The subsample of
exporters consists of those rms for which we have data on exporting activity
for each year. Based on this criterion, 41% of the rms belong to the subsam-
ple of exporting rms. Each of the two subsamples is split according to the
same sector, size and period criteria as in section 3.4. Due to the constraint
that each sector-size-period subsample should contain at least 30 observa-
tions, we are able to obtain 161 estimates of Eq. (8) -controlling for year and
rm e¤ects- for the subsample of exporters and 174 estimates for the subsample
of non-exporters. Both subsamples have 159 sector-size-period subsamplesin
common. For reasons of comparability, we focus on these 159 estimates in the
discussion below. Table A.5 in Appendix A summarises the mean and quartile
values of the estimated reduced-form coe¢ cients for respectively the subsample
of exporters, the subsample of non-exporters and the total sample. To take
into account the precision of the estimates, we weight each estimate by the in-
verse of the sampling variance. From Table A.6, it follows that the estimated
reduced-form coe¢ cients (bjsp and ^jsp) do not di¤er signicantly between the
subsample of exporters and the subsample of non-exporters.
To check whether the competitive e¤ect varies according to the export status of
rms, we re-estimated specication (2) of Tables 5 and 6 for the subsample of
exporters, the subsample of non-exporters and the total sample (see Table 7).23
From Table 7, it follows that imports from developed countries exert a statis-
tically signicant negative e¤ect on both the estimated mark-up and workers
bargaining power of exporting as well as non-exporting rms. Moreover, the
size of the e¤ect does not depend on the export status.
23 In order not to lose any information, we used all available Part Iestimates of ^jsp andbjsp for each (sub)sample resulting in a di¤erent number of observations for each (sub)sample
whereas in Table A.5 in Appendix A, we only used the estimates of the common sector-size-
period subsamples to ensure comparability.
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Table 7
Determinants of estimated price-cost mark-up ^jsp and bjsp
Exporters, non-exporters and total sample
^jsp
bjsp
Exporters Non-exportersa Total sample Exporters Non-exportersa Total sample
Variables (2)b (2)b (2)b (2)b (2)b (2)b
1995-1998
-0.080
(0.031)
-0.067
(0.025)
-0.060
(0.025)
-0.136
(0.020)
-0.109
(0.023)
-0.109
(0.021)
1999-2003
-0.023
(0.030)
-0.019
(0.024)
-0.028
(0.023)
-0.134
(0.031)
-0.107
(0.029)
-0.108
(0.027)
Medium-sized
0.049
(0.021)
0.045
(0.015)
0.044
(0.014)
0.040
(0.034)
0.051
(0.028)
0.048
(0.026)
Large
0.043
(0.022)
0.052
(0.017)
0.051
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.034)
0.017
(0.030)
0.016
(0.029)
VALUCYC
0.471
(0.287)
0.088
(0.264)
0.019
(0.256)
lag(EXPFIRM)
0.132
(0.237)
-0.0000
(0.182)
0.001
(0.178)
0.147
(0.226)
0.299
(0.213)
0.297
(0.203)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-1.327
(0.551)
-1.395
(0.544)
-1.133
(0.522)
-0.822
(0.479)
-0.839
(0.331)
-0.850
(0.323)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
-0.288
(0.412)
-0.098
(0.360)
0.240
(0.339)
-0.069
(0.364)
0.145
(0.385)
0.211
(0.285)
lag(R&DRATIO)
2.754
(2.791)
3.161
(2.899)
3.972
(2.795)
-5.205
(1.445)
-1.844
(1.851)
-1.688
(1.508)
HERF
0.285
(0.160)
0.285
(0.153)
0.274
(0.148)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.274 0.343 0.340 0.570 0.574 0.582
#Obs. 161 174 179 161 174 179
The dependent variable (price-cost mark-up or workersbargaining power) is taken from the Part I estimation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, they have been corrected to account for the generated regressand problem
following Lewis and Linzer (2005) and clustered at the sector-period level.
Signicant at 1%; Signicant at 5%; Signicant at 10%.
a 41% of the rms belong to the subsample of exporters. Within the subsample of non-exporters, 28% of them report export activity
for at least one year but not for each year.
b This number refers to specication (2) in Tables 5 and 6.
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4.4 Product market versus labour market discipline and
the price-cost margin puzzle
What is the signicance of both the mark-up and the bargaining power sen-
sitivities to imports in relation to the overall ndings in graph 1 highlighting
that price-cost margins are about the same? Based on the model in section
2, the price-cost margin, PCM , is derived from equation (7) which -dropping
subscripts- is rewritten as:
N + M =

1  "QK

(1  )

+ 
=) PCM  1  N   M =
 
1  1  "
Q
K

!
(1  ) (12)
Di¤erentiation of Eq. (12) implies:
PCM
PCM
=
(1 "QK)

1  (1 "
Q
K)



  
1  
Using the expression of (
1 "QK)
 implied by Eq. (12) leads to:
PCM =
1    PCM

   PCM
1   
Focusing on the e¤ect of imports, the impact on the price-cost margin can be
broken down in two components, the product-market-discipline e¤ect and the
labour-market-discipline e¤ect:
@PCM
@IMPNORTH
=
1    PCM

@
@IMPNORTH
  PCM
1  
@
@IMPNORTH
Based on the average estimates in Table 2 and Graph 1 ( = 1:25,  = 0:40,
PCM = 0:14), the order of magnitude of the impact of imports from developed
countries on the price-cost margin is given by:
@PCM
@IMPNORTH
= 0:37
@
@IMPNORTH
  0:23 @
@IMPNORTH
The average estimates in Tables 5 and 6 give @@IMPNORTH   1:0 and @@IMPNORTH  0:8, which leads to the following break-down:
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PCM = product-markt-discipline e¤ect + labour-market-discipline e¤ect
=   0:37IMPNORTH + 0:19IMPNORTH
This back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that rstly, the labour-market
discipline e¤ect might have counteracted half of the product-market discipline
e¤ect and secondly, that import competition has contributed to a decline in the
price-cost margin of around 1 point on average over the period.24 The puzzle is
therefore only partially resolved.
5 Conclusion
Many empirical studies have provided evidence that trade has a pro-competitive
e¤ect by reducing mark-ups to marginal cost in import competing sectors. Most
of them have focused on developing countries assuming a perfectly competitive
labour market. In contrast, this study concentrates on a developed country
and takes into account labour market imperfections, using rm-level data for
UK manufacturing sectors. Our results indicate that both the mark-ups and
workers bargaining power decreased in the mid-nineties. Moreover, imports
from developed countries are shown to contribute signicantly to these changes,
whereas rm exports have a weakly signicant positive inuence on the workers
bargaining power. These joint e¤ects imply that trade has exerted a conicting
impact on price-cost margins, i.e. on the share of the rents kept by the rms.
Based on the estimates, the labour-market-discipline e¤ect might have coun-
teracted half of the product-market-discipline e¤ect. We also nd, consistent
with the recent literature on rm heterogeneity, that small rms have lower
mark-ups. Additionally, their workers are subject to a lower bargaining power.
24Based on Table A.3 in Appendix A, IMPNORTH has increased by 6 points on average
over the total period and ( 0:37 + 0:19) 0:06   0:01.
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Appendix A: Statistical annex
Table A.1
Sector repartition of the sample
Code Name
15 Food products and beverages
17 Textiles
18 Wearing apparel, dressing, dying of fur
19 Leather, leather products and footwear
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21 Pulp, paper and paper products
22 Printing and publishing
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
30 O¢ ce, accounting and computing machinery
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
32 Radio, television and communication equipment
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Other transport equipment
36 Manufacturing, n.e.c.
Table A.2
Description and source of variables in Part II regressions
Variable Description Source
CAPIT
Log of stock market capitalization
as a percentage of GDP
Datastream
EMPL
Log of rm average employment level
across the whole period
OneSource, FAME
EXPFIRM Firm exports/turnover ratio OneSource, FAME
HERF Sample-based Herndahl index OneSource, FAME
IMPORT
Sectoral import penetration ratio:
imports/(imports+production-exports)
STAN
IMPNORTH
IMPORT from Western Europe, North America,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand
Bilateral Trade Database (OECD)
IMPSOUTH Complement of IMPNORTH Bilateral Trade Database (OECD)
PMR Product market regulation index Nicoletti et al. (2001), Conway et al. (2005)
R&DRATIO Sectoral share of R&D expenses in total output OECD
UNEMPRATE Country-level unemployment rate Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
UNIONDENS Manufacturing-level union density Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
REPLRATE Manufacturing-level replacement rate Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
VALUCYC De-trended sectoral annual change in value added STAN
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Table A.3
Summary statistics for the import variables
IMPNORTH IMPSOUTH
Change in
IMPNORTH
Change in
IMPSOUTH
Sector 1988 1994 2000 1988 1994 2000 1988/2000 1988/2000
15 0.117 0.123 0.139 0.056 0.067 0.069 0.022 0.014
17 0.201 0.210 0.194 0.166 0.253 0.345 -0.008 0.179
18 0.201 0.210 0.234 0.166 0.254 0.417 0.033 0.251
19 0.215 0.260 0.303 0.178 0.314 0.539 0.088 0.361
20 0.218 0.206 0.188 0.105 0.110 0.127 -0.030 0.022
21 0.312 0.285 0.291 0.042 0.055 0.067 -0.022 0.024
22 0.062 0.067 0.065 0.008 0.013 0.015 0.002 0.006
24 0.258 0.334 0.403 0.085 0.108 0.137 0.145 0.052
25 0.183 0.182 0.181 0.050 0.064 0.083 -0.003 0.034
26 0.115 0.115 0.123 0.037 0.044 0.057 0.008 0.021
27 0.195 0.275 0.314 0.248 0.173 0.156 0.119 -0.092
28 0.106 0.101 0.115 0.028 0.036 0.053 0.009 0.024
29 0.390 0.401 0.455 0.078 0.078 0.114 0.065 0.036
30 0.672 0.684 0.660 0.138 0.192 0.406 -0.012 0.268
31 0.235 0.312 0.377 0.072 0.106 0.188 0.143 0.116
32 0.372 0.465 0.590 0.147 0.261 0.311 0.218 0.164
33 0.412 0.419 0.493 0.098 0.117 0.138 0.081 0.040
34 0.379 0.409 0.489 0.073 0.101 0.128 0.110 0.054
35 0.153 0.148 0.365 0.371 0.353 0.349 0.213 -0.022
36 0.178 0.166 0.195 0.147 0.177 0.184 0.017 0.037
Unweighted
average
0.249 0.269 0.309 0.115 0.144 0.194 0.060 0.079
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Table A.4
Determinants of the estimated workers’ bargaining power, dependent variable ln(
eφjsp
1−eφjsp
)
Variables (1)
a
(2)
a
(3)
a
(4)
a
(5)
a
(6)
a
(7)
a
(8)
b
(9)
b
(10)
b
1995-1998
-0.412∗∗∗
(0.0861)
-0.406∗∗∗
(0.089)
-0.419∗∗∗
(0.095)
1999-2003
-0.368∗∗∗
(0.112)
-0.375∗∗∗
(0.112)
-0.409∗∗∗
(0.118)
Medium-sized
0.145
(0.106)
0.141
(0.105)
0.131
(0.107)
0.163
(0.107)
Large
0.024
(0.109)
0.021
(0.109)
0.001
(0.111)
0.066
(0.109)
EMPL
-0.019
(0.026)
-0.018
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.028)
-0.012
(0.026)
-0.011
(0.026)
-0.005
(0.026)
lag(EXPFIRM)
0.731
(0.855)
0.838
(0.886)
1.021
(0.909)
0.989
(0.911)
0.593
(0.887)
0.899
(0.899)
0.885
(0.898)
0.989
(0.879)
0.529
(0.850)
0.632
(0.868)
lag(IMPORT)
-2.163∗∗
(0.868)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-3.061∗∗
(1.469)
-2.516
(1.683)
-2.586
(1.742)
-5.461∗∗∗
(1.447)
-3.191∗
(1.893)
-3.261∗
(1.905)
-0.707
(1.773)
-1.764
(1.655)
-1.988
(1.668)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
-0.458
(1.398)
-0.024
(1.547)
-0.161
(1.619)
-3.150∗
(1.652)
-0.960
(1.843)
-1.060
(1.860)
-1.803
(1.858)
-6.268∗∗∗
(2.252)
-6.166∗∗
(2.467)
lag(R&DRATIO)
-10.446
(7.720)
-7.752
(7.480)
-7.554
(8.802)
-7.964
(9.136)
-11.431
(7.796)
-9.749
(10.101)
-9.962
(10.159)
-3.896
(7.909)
-12.008
(10.275)
-11.926
(10.720)
lag(PMR)
0.245∗∗∗
(0.065)
lag(UNIONDENS)
4.675∗∗∗
(1.310)
lag(UNEMPRATE)
-8.277∗∗∗
(2.826)
REPLRATE
12.321∗∗∗
(4.418)
lag(CAPIT)
-0.373∗∗∗
(0.138)
HERF
0.982∗
(0.686)
1.377∗
(0.804)
1.426∗
(0.848)
1.014
(0.906)
1.532
(0.988)
1.537
(0.937)
1.216
(0.735)
1.852
(1.242)
1.932
(1.224)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.560 0.561 0.534 0.527 0.511 0.501 0.499 0.553 0.472 0.462
#Obs. 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
The dependent variable (ln(
φˆjsp
1−φˆjsp
) is taken from the Part I estimation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
they have been corrected to account for the generated regressand problem following Lewis and Linzer (2005) and
clustered at the sector-period level. ∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
a 3-year lags used.
b 5-year lags used except for EXPFIRM .
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Table A.5
Weighteda mean and quartile values of the reduced-form coe¢ cients ^jsp and ^jsp
Exporters, non-exporters and total sample
YEAR AND FIRM FIXED EFFECTS
159 ssp estimatesb bjsp bjsp
Exporters
ssp mean 0.210 (0.077) 0.827 (0.993)
ssp Q1 0.157 0.194
ssp median 0.202 0.757
ssp Q3 0.252 1.390
Non-exporters
ssp mean 0.203 (0.075) 0.774 (0.838)
ssp Q1 0.155 0.170
ssp median 0.194 0.681
ssp Q3 0.231 1.162
Total sample
ssp mean 0.206 (0.069) 0.790 (0.606)
ssp Q1 0.171 0.219
ssp median 0.197 0.726
ssp Q3 0.227 1.230
a Each estimate is weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance.
b sspdenotes sector-size-period.
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Appendix B: 1992 Single Market Program
In order to address the endogeneity issue related to the trade variables, some
empirical studies (e.g. Botasso and Sembenelli, 2001; Gri¢ th, 2001) have used
a criterion suggested by the European Commission. Sectors were grouped ac-
cording to the level of non-tari¤ barriers that the 1992 Single Market Program
(SMP) was expected to reduce. Based on this criterion, sectors were classi-
ed as having a high, moderate or low sensitivity to the SMP (Buigues et al.,
1990). Out of 120 NACE three-digit manufacturing sectors, 14 were classied as
highly sensitive and 26 as moderately sensitive to the SMP. There is one major
di¢ culty in applying such a strategy here. In order to identify the structural
parameters of interest, the mark-up and bargaining power, the level of aggrega-
tion is two-digit and, for a given two-digit sector, the corresponding three-digit
components generally fall in di¤erent sensitivity categories.
However, even though the match is far from perfect, the two-digit sectors were
tentatively classied according to their sensitivity level, as displayed in Table
B.1. Sectors are ranked based on the changes in the IMPNORTH ratio in
column 2. Column 3 reports the apparent break in the series based on Graph
B.1, i.e. the year where imports from developed countries have accelerated. The
average increase in IMPNORTH, which is reported in Table A.3 in Appendix
A, is entirely explained by 9 out of the 20 sectors, 7 of which saw an acceler-
ation in IMPNORTH just after the completion of the SMP. Moreover, the
sensitivity to the SMP reported in the fourth column of Table B.1 indicates that
there is a fairly clear relation between the increase in imports from developed
countries and the expected sensitivity to the SMP. This is reassuring because
this means that the trade ratio seems to capture reasonably well the major
structural reforms that took place at the beginning of the period under study.
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Table B.1
Changes in imports from developed countries and sensitivity to the 1992 Single Market Program
Sector
Change in
IMPNORTH
between 1988-2000
Apparent break in the
IMPNORTH series
Tentative
two-digit sensitivity
based on Griﬃth (2001)
Comments
32 +0.22 1993 high
35 +0.21 1995 high/medium
Shipbuilding, Railway and tramway are classified as
highly sensitive, while aerospace equipment falls in the medium category.
The latter explains most of the increase in import penetration.
24 +0.15 1993 high/low
Specialised chemical and pharmaceutical products had
had high NTBs and account for more of the increase in IMPNORTH.
31 +0.14 1994 medium
27 +0.12 1988? low Most of the increase seems to be due to the surprising 1988 trough in the series.
34 +0.11 gradual medium
19 +0.09 1994 medium/low
33 +0.08 1994 high
29 +0.06 1994 medium/high
18 +0.03 medium/low
15 +0.02 low
36 +0.02 high
28 +0.01 low
26 +0.01 low
22 +0.00 low
25 -0.00 low
17 -0.01 low
30 -0.01 high Foreign competition based on the import ratio was already intense before the SMP.
21 -0.02 low
20 -0.03 low
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Graph B.1 
Share of UK imports from developed countries in sectoral demand, 
two-digit manufacturing sectors, OECD database 
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